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.I shall, therefore,employ the sequel of this part, First, In removing some difficulties,concerning particular causes of these passions.Secondly, In examiningthe compound affections, which arise from the mixture of love andhatred with other emotions.Nothing is more evident, than that any person acquires our kindness, oris expos'd to our ill-will, in proportion to the pleasure or uneasiness wereceive from him, and that the passions keep pace exactly with thesensations in all their changes and variations.Whoever can find the means either by his services, his beauty, or his flattery, to render himselfuseful or agreeable to us, is sure of our affections: As on the other hand,whoever harms or displeases us never fails to excite our anger or hatred.When our own nation is at war with any other, we detest them under thecharacter of cruel, perfidious, unjust and violent: But always esteemourselves and allies equitable, moderate, and merciful.If the general ofour enemies be successful, `tis with difficulty we allow him the figureand character of a man.He is a sorcerer: He has a communication withdaemons; as is reported of Oliver Cromwell, and the Duke ofLuxembourg: He is bloody-minded, and takes a pleasure in death anddestruction.But if the success be on our side, our commander has all theopposite good qualities, and is a pattern of virtue, as well as of courageand conduct.His treachery we call policy: His cruelty is an evilinseparable from war.In short, every one of his faults we eitherendeavour to extenuate, or dignify it with the name of that virtue, whichapproaches it.`Tis evident the same method of thinking runs thro'common life.There are some, who add another condition, and require not only that thepain and pleasure arise from the person, but likewise that it ariseknowingly, and with a particular design and intention.A man, whowounds and harms us by accident, becomes not our enemy upon thataccount, nor do we think ourselves bound by any ties of gratitude to one,who does us any service after the same manner.By the intention wejudge of the actions, and according as that is good or bad, they becomecauses of love or hatred.But here we must make a distinction.If that quality in another, whichpleases or displeases, be constant and inherent in his person andcharacter, it will cause love or hatred independent of the intention: Butotherwise a knowledge and design is requisite, in order to give rise tothese passions.One that is disagreeable by his deformity or folly is theobject of our aversion, tho' nothing be more certain, than that he has notthe least intention of displeasing us by these qualities.But if theuneasiness proceed not from a quality, but an action, which is produc'dand annihilated in a moment, `tis necessary, in order to produce somerelation, and connect this action sufficiently with the person.that it bederiv'd from a particular fore-thought and design.'Tis not enough, thatthe action arise from the person, and have him for its immediate causeand author.This relation alone is too feeble and inconstant to be afoundation for these passions.It reaches not the sensible and thinking part, and neither proceeds from any thing durable in him, nor leaves anything behind it; but passes in a moment, and is as if it had never been.On the other hand, an intention shews certain qualities, whichremaining after the action is perform'd, connect it with the person, andfacilitate the transition of ideas from one to the other.We can neverthink of him without reflecting on these qualities; unless repentance anda change of life have produc'd an alteration in that respect: In which casethe passion is likewise alter'd.This therefore is one reason, why anintention is requisite to excite either love or hatred.But we must farther consider, that an intention, besides itsstrengthening the relation of ideas, is often necessary to produce arelation of impressions, and give rise to pleasure and uneasiness.For `tisobservable, that the principal part of an injury is the contempt andhatred, which it shews in the person, that injures us; and without that,the mere harm gives us a less sensible uneasiness.In like manner, agood office is agreeable, chiefly because it flatters our vanity, and is aproof of the kindness and esteem of the person, who performs it.Theremoval of the intention, removes the mortification in the one case, andvanity in the other, and must of course cause a remarkable diminution inthe passions of love and hatred.I grant, that these effects of the removal of design, in diminishing therelations of impressions and ideas, are not entire, nor able to removeevery degree of these relations.But then I ask, if the removal of design beable entirely to remove the passion of love and hatred? Experience, I amsure, informs us of the contrary, nor is there any thing more certain,than that men often fall into a violent anger for injuries, which theythemselves must own to be entirely involuntary and accidental.Thisemotion, indeed, cannot be of long continuance; but still is sufficient toshew, that there is a natural connexion betwixt uneasiness and anger,and that the relation of impressions will operate upon a very smallrelation of ideas
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