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.But, Gromyko went on, the recent “discord” over Cuba underlined the fact that “we live on one planet” and “bridges have to be built” to link the two countries.He asked Thompson to ascertain whether Kennedy genuinely wanted a personal meeting, mak-ing clear that the Kremlin still thought this would be “useful” for both sides.The White House was quick to respond.“The President remains desirous of meeting Khrushchev,” Gromyko was told.“He hopes that it will be possible to adhere to the original schedule of early June in Vienna but is not at the moment in a position to make a firm decision.”The Soviets were promised a definite reply within the next two weeks.69Kennedy’s message indicated that the prospects for a summitwould be helped by progress toward a peaceful settlement of the crisis in Laos.There an American-backed military government was under attack from the communist Pathet Lao, aided by North Vietnam.Laos was poor, tiny and landlocked—hardly a country of185reynolds_01.qxd 8/31/07 10:30 AM Page 186sum m i t sgreat strategic importance.Nor was it a credible ally.The economist John Kenneth Galbraith, Kennedy’s ambassador to India,scoffed that in military terms “the entire Laos nation is clearly inferior to a battalion of conscientious objectors from World War I.”Seen in a Cold War context, however, Laos took on larger significance because North Vietnam was backed by communist China.Tomany in Washington, the United States would have to draw a line against Chinese expansion sooner or later.Admiral Arleigh Burke, deputy chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, warned that “each time you give ground it is harder to take a stand next time” and said that abandoning Laos could mean having to fight for South Vietnam or Thailand.But the military’s fevered talk about troops, air strikes and even nuclear war alarmed Kennedy, especially after the Bay of Pigs fiasco had undermined his respect for so-called expert advice.His preferred solution was a genuinely neutral Laos and, to that end, an international conference was convened in Geneva in April.Hence his warning to Gromyko that progress at Geneva would make a Vienna summit “easier from the point of view of public opinion” at home and abroad.70Laos was partly reason, partly pretext for procrastinating about the summit.On May 9, three days after the reply was sent toGromyko, Bobby Kennedy met secretly in Washington withGeorgi Bolshakov from the Soviet embassy.Ostensibly a newsman, Bolshakov actually worked for Soviet military intelligence and was a close friend of Khrushchev’s son-in-law.Their meeting, arranged through an American journalist, Frank Holeman, took place at 8:30p.m.at the back entrance to the Justice Department.The two men walked out onto the Mall.Bobby Kennedy started very firmly, referring to recent events in Cuba and Laos.The Soviets, he said, seemed to be underestimating the capabilities of the United States and the president.If this continued the administration would “have to take corrective action, changing the course of its policies.” Having laid that on the line, Bobby then indicated that his brother held out hopes for realprogress at Vienna, above all a treaty banning nuclear tests.Officially this issue was deadlocked because it depended on verification and 186reynolds_01.qxd 8/31/07 10:30 AM Page 187v i e nna 19 61the Americans demanded twenty on-site inspections a year whereas the Soviets stuck at three.Now, secretly, Bobby said that the administration was willing to compromise on ten inspections, if it were made to seem like a Soviet offer.The United States wanted the details to be fleshed out through diplomatic channels in the next few weeks so the two leaders could sign an agreement in Vienna.He made it clear that the president was “not interested in a summit where leaders just exchange views.”71Bobby Kennedy’s meeting with Bolshakov on May 9 was enor-mously important.It was the first of a series of regular encounters between the two men, lasting until December 1962, which created a back channel between the White House and the Kremlin
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