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.P.J.Video, Inc.,475 U.S.868, 878 106 S.Ct.1610, 89 L.Ed.2d 871 (1986). I, I.M.VIRTUOUS, being duly sworn, deposes and says:I am presently a Confi dential Criminal Investigator assigned to the HopeCounty District Attorney s Office and prior to this, was a detective with the State ofConfusion Police Department for approximately 25 years.On October 26, 2007 I rented and viewed the videotape movie CALIFORNIAVALLEY GIRLS in a viewing booth at Sex Frolics, an adult entertainment establish-ment located at 6900 Smut Road.The viewing of CALIFORNIA VALLEY GIRLS began at 12:00 Noon and lasted until 1:33 P.M.The content and character of the above mentioned video movie is as fol-lows: Six white females, approximately 18 to 25 years of age, are unemployedand attempt to make a living by becoming prostitutes.The first scene is a bedroomscene where two females are involved in lovemaking, fondling, and cunnilingus.The second scene depicts a white male and a white female having intercourse inthe back of a van.The third scene is a house scene where six girls, all whitefemales, are introduced to the art of lovemaking.One male, approximately 35years of age, is teaching the girls the art of fellatio with each one of them perform-ing this act on him.The next scene is a bedroom scene in a home where a husbandand wife, and the wife s friend, perform various sexual acts which include inter-course, fellatio, anal intercourse, and cunnilingus.The movie ends with somelesbianism where the wife performs cunnilingus on the friend while the latterperforms fellatio on the husband and they engage in intercourse and analintercourse.Third, the Fourth Amendment requirement that search warrants particu-larly describe the things to be seized is applied with rigor when the thingsto be seized are literary materials.General language authorizing seizure of all obscene publications found at a particular location is unconstitutionalbecause it delegates to the executing officer discretion to make on-the-spotdeterminations of whether particular works are obscene.This determination56can only be made by a judge.Finally, police officers may not seize all copies of items described in theirsearch warrant.Their mission is to obtain evidence for use at trial; one ortwo copies are enough for this purpose.Police may not halt sales by seizingall copies of a work until after the work has been adjudicated obscene in an57adversarial legal proceeding.56Marcus v.Search Warrant, 367 U.S.717, 81 S.Ct.1708, 6 L.Ed.2d 1127 (1961);A Quantity of Copies of Books v.Kansas, 378 U.S.205, 84 S.Ct.1723, 12 L.Ed.2d 809(1964).57Marcus v.Search Warrant, supra note 56; Heller v.New York, supra note 55; Fort WayneBooks, Inc.v.Indiana, 489 U.S.46, 109 S.Ct.916, 103 L.Ed.2d 34 (1989). 56 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 2.7§ 2.7 Fighting Words58In Chaplinsky v.New Hampshire, a man was arrested for calling the citymarshal a God damned racketeer and a damned Fascist in a face-to-faceencounter.Prior to Chaplinsky, the Court had observed that a resort to epithetsor personal abuse is not in any proper sense communication of information59safeguarded by the Constitution. In Chaplinsky, the Supreme Court offi-cially excluded fighting words from the protection of the First Amendment.Subsequent cases have reaffirmed the holding in Chaplinsky and havesought to clarify the scope of this exclusion.The fighting words exclusionis not concerned with speech that communicates an idea or makes a state-60ment about the speaker s beliefs.Marching through a Jewish neighborhoodwearing Nazi uniforms bearing the swastika is an example.This conduct isprotected by the First Amendment because the marchers are expressing their61views.Speech that communicates ideas cannot be punished as fighting word,62no matter how offensive or provocative. Fighting words are used for adifferent purpose.Their purpose is purely to inflict injury.There is no judicially established list of words that, when spoken, alwaysconstitute fighting words. Whether language constitutes fighting words requires an examination both of the words used and the context in which theyare uttered.A person may be arrested for using fighting words only if theperson s language is:58315 U.S.568, 62 S.Ct.766, 86 L.Ed.1031 (1942).59Cantwell v.Connecticut, 310 U.S.296, 60 S.Ct.900, 84 L.Ed.1221 (1940) (dicta).60See, e.g., Boos v.Barry, supra note 40 ( .in public debate our own citizens must tolerateinsulting, and even outrageous, speech in order to provide adequate breathing space to thefreedoms protected by the First Amendment ); Bachellar v.Maryland, 397 U.S.564, 90S.Ct.1312, 25 L.Ed.2d 570 (1970) (.under our Constitution the public expression ofideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some oftheir hearers.); Brown v.Louisiana, 383 U.S.131, 133 n.1, 86 S.Ct.719, 15 L.Ed.2d637 (1966) (Participants in an orderly demonstration in a public place are not chargeablewith the danger, unprovoked except by the fact of the constitutionally protected demon-stration itself, that their critics might react with disorder or violence); Edwards v.SouthCarolina, 372 U.S.229, 83 S.Ct.680, 9 L.Ed.2d 697 (1963); Cox v.Louisiana, 379 U.S.536, 85 S.Ct.453, 13 L.Ed.2d 471 (1965); Street v.New York, 394 U.S.576, 89 S.Ct.1354, 22 L.Ed.2d 572 (1969); Forsyth County v.Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S.123, 112S.Ct.2395, 120 L.Ed.2d 101 (1992).61Collin v.Smith, supra note 27.See also R.A.V.v.City of St.Paul, 505 U.S.377, 395, 112S.Ct.2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992) (invalidating statute making it an offense to displaysymbols, such as burning crosses and swastikas, known to arouse anger in others on thebasis of race, creed, religion, or gender); Brandenburg v.Ohio, supra note 28 (overturningconviction for burning a cross at a Ku Klux Klan rally); Sons of Confederate Veterans,Inc.ex rel.Griffin v.Commissioner of Virginia Dept.of Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610(4th Cir.2002) (invalidating statute which prohibited use of Confederate flag on specialtylicense plates); Church of American Knights of Ku Klux Klan v.Kerik, 232 F.Supp.2d 205(S.D.N.Y.2002) (invalidating statute prohibiting wearing of masks at public gathering).62See, e.g., Terminiello v.Chicago, 337 U.S.1, 69 S.Ct.894, 93 L.Ed.1131 (1949). § 2.7 FREEDOM OF SPEECH 571.Personally abusive, derisive, or insulting.2.Spoken in a face-to-face encounter under circumstances likely to63provoke the other person into making an immediate violent response.Whether the second element is present calls for consideration of the factualcontext, including the time and place of the communication, the characteristicsof the parties, their proximity, and other factors.Personally abusive remarksmade by a feeble old lady or shouted by a person passing by in a car, forexample, would not constitute fighting words, because the second elementis absent.The fighting words exclusion has a narrow application when thetarget of verbal abuse is a police officer because police officers are trained64 65not to respond in physical ways.Making profane gestures or calling a66police officer an ass is not enough to justify an arrest for using fightingwords. While the Supreme Court has stopped short of saying the fightingwords exclusion can never apply when the object of verbal abuse is a policeofficer, the indignities must go far beyond what an ordinary person would be67 68expected to endure.In Lewis v
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